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Abstract
Contrary to an oft-made claim, there can be observational distinctions
(say for the expansion of the universe or the cosmological constant) between
“single-history” quantum theories and “many-worlds” quantum theories. The
distinctions occur when the number of observers is not uniquely predicted by
the theory. In single-history theories, each history is weighted simply by
its quantum-mechanical probability, but in many-worlds theories in which
random observations are considered, there should also be the weighting by
the numbers or amounts of observations occurring in each history.
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Quantum mechanics is so mysterious that its precise content or interpretation
is not agreed upon even by leading physicists. Although the number of versions or
interpretations of quantum mechanics is huge, here I wish to focus upon two main
classes of interpretations, which I shall call “single-history” versions and “many-
worlds” versions, and show how they might be distinguished observationally. (Sim-
ilar observational distinctions can be made between analogous “single-history” and
“many-worlds” versions of classical physics, but since we know that the universe is
quantum, here I shall focus on quantum theories.)
In single-history versions, the quantum formalism gives probabilities for various
alternative sequences of events, but only one choice among the possible alternatives
is assumed to occur in actuality. For example, a wavefunction that gives nonzero
amplitudes for many different alternative events may be assumed to undergo a se-
quence of collapses to give a single sequence of actually occurring events, which may
be considered to be a unique history.
On the other hand, the many-worlds versions began with Everett’s relative-state
formalism [1] in which the wavefunction never collapses. In a suitable basis each
component of the wavefunction may be considered to be a different “world,” leading
to this interpretation’s being labeled the “many-worlds” interpretation.
The consistent or decohering histories formulation of quantum mechanics [2] does
not by itself imply whether only a single coarse-grained history actually occurs, or
whether many do, and the probabilities of histories that it gives do not depend on
whether only one, or instead many, of the histories are actual rather than merely pos-
sible. However, I am considering probabilities for observations rather than merely
probabilities for histories, so the consistent or decohering histories formalism needs
to be extended in order to calculate these probabilities of interest here. The exten-
sion then depends on whether many, or only one, of the histories are actual.
It is often claimed that there is no observational distinction between many-world
and single-history versions of a quantum theory [3], but here I shall refute that.
In processes with fixed observers that remember their observations, it does seem
to be true that there is generally no distinction that a single observer can make
between single-history and many-worlds quantum theories that are otherwise iden-
tical. This is because then the measure for each observation in a many-world theory
is proportional to the probability of that observation in the corresponding single-
history theory. This result depends upon the lack of interference between “worlds”
in which different observations are made, which is assured if the memory records of
the different observations are orthogonal.
To circumvent this no-observable-distinction result, David Deutsch [4] has pro-
posed an experiment in which an observer “splits” into two copies which make
different observations and remember the fact of observation, but not the distinct
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observations themselves, and so can in principle be rejoined coherently back into a
single copy. However, doing this in practice appears to be technologically extremely
challenging.
On the other hand, what I wish to demonstrate here is that if different “worlds”
do not have the same number of observers, then the measures for observations in
the many-worlds theory can be different from being merely proportional to the
probabilities in the corresponding single-history theory. Then what an observer
would be typically expected to observe in the two theories can be distinct.
Consider a theory of quantum cosmology that gives a quantum state for the
universe in which there are different “worlds” with greatly different numbers of ob-
servers. For calculating how typical various observations are, in a single-history
theory one should weight the “worlds” purely by how probable they are, but in
a many-worlds theory, one should weight the “worlds” not only by their quantum
mechanical measures (the analogue in a deterministic many-worlds theory of the
probabilities in an indeterministic single-histories theory), but also by how much
observation occurs within each “world.” This distinction leads to different predic-
tions as to which observations would be typical within the two types of theories.
As a grossly oversimplified illustration, consider the example in which a quantum
cosmology theory gave a quantum state (before any possible collapse) that had one
“world” with observers, and a second one with none. Suppose that the first “world”
had a measure of 0.0000000001 and the second one had a measure of 0.9999999999.
In the single-history version of this theory, these two normalized measures would
be the probabilities for the two “worlds,” so the probability would be extremely low
that this theory led to any observers. A non-null observation would thus have such
a low likelihood within this single-history theory that it would be strong evidence
against this theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, both “worlds”
would exist, with the measures indicating something like the “amount” by which
they exist. But since the observations that occur in the first “world” definitely exist
within this many-worlds theory as realities and not just as possibilities, the existence
of an observation is not evidence against this many-worlds theory.
To put it another way, for considering observations within a many-worlds theory,
one must multiply the measure for each world by a measure for the observations
within that world. (Crudely, one may use the number of observations within the
world, though in a final theory I would expect a refinement, so that, for example, a
human’s observation is weighted more heavily than an ant’s). When one does this
for the example above, the first “world” makes up the entirety of the weighting in
the many-worlds theory, even though in the single-history theory that “world” has
an extremely low probability and would be quite unexpected.
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Now consider a second toy theory in which there are two “worlds” that both have
observers, but their numbers and observations differ. For example, let World A last
just barely long enough for it to have 1010 observers, all during the recontracting
stage fairly near a big crunch, and let World B last much longer than the age range
at which observers occur and have 1090 observers when the universe is expanding.
Suppose World A has measure almost unity and World B has measure 10−30.
In the single-history version of this theory, these (normalized) measures are prob-
abilities, so with near certainty, we can deduce that we should be in World A and
see a contracting universe in this theory. Our actual observation of an expanding
universe would then be strong evidence against this single-history theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, all of the obser-
vations actually exist. To calculate which observations are typical, one needs the
measures for the observations themselves. Presumably these are given by the ex-
pectation values of certain operators associated with the corresponding observations
[5]. Crudely one might suppose the total for all the observations within one “world”
is roughly proportional to the number of observers within that “world,” multiplied
by the measure for the “world.” At this level of approximation, the total measure
for the observations in the many-worlds version of this second toy model is thus 1010
for World A and 1060 for World B. Therefore, an observation chosen at random in
this many-worlds theory is 1050 more likely to be from World B, with the universe
observed to be expanding, than from World A with the universe seen to be con-
tracting. Our actual observation of an expanding universe would then be consistent
with this theory.
Thus in this second toy cosmological model, we can reject its single-history ver-
sion because of the low probability it gives, not for our existence this time, but for
whether we see the universe expanding. In this way observations can in principle be
used to distinguish between many-worlds and single-history quantum theories.
In these examples, the statistical predictions of what a random observer should
be expected to observe would be the same for a many-worlds theory and for the
corresponding single-history theory if the latter had its quantum-mechanical proba-
bility for each history also weighted by the number of observers in that history, but
I am assuming that this is not the case. Note that one could still get observable dis-
tinctions even if the single-history theory had a sequence of wavefunction collapses,
each of which had the weighting by the number of observers in each branch at the
time of the collapse, but I shall not consider further this possibility either.
There is the challenge that at present we apparently do not know enough about
the quantum state of the universe to say with certainty whether our observations
favor a many-worlds theory or a single-history theory. Nevertheless, I can summarize
some highly speculative evidence that gives a preliminary suggestion that a many-
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histories theory might be observationally favored.
This evidence starts with the Hartle-Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal for the
quantum state of the universe [6], which of course is quite speculative but seems
to me to be the most elegant sketch so far of a proposal (certainly not technically
complete at present) for the quantum state of the universe. Under certain unproven
assumptions and approximations, in a homogeneous, isotropic three-sphere minisu-
perspace toy model with a single massive inflaton scalar field, the no-boundary pro-
posal leads in the semiclassical regime to a set of “worlds” or macroscopic classical
spacetimes that are Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universes with various amounts
of inflation and hence various total lifetimes and maximum sizes, and with mea-
sure approximately proportional to epia
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0 , where a0 is the radius of the Euclidean
four-dimensional hemisphere where the solution nucleates [6].
This nucleating radius a0 is inversely proportional to the initial value of the infla-
ton scalar field, multiplied by its mass m in Planck units, whereas the growth factor
during inflation, and the lifetime of the resulting Friedmann-Robertson-Walker uni-
verse, go exponentially with the square of the initial value of the inflaton scalar field.
Therefore, if one works out the quantum measure in terms of the volume of the uni-
verse at the end of inflation (say V in Planck units), one finds that at the tree level
it is very roughly proportional to exp [(4.5pi/m2)/(lnm3V + 1.5 ln lnm3V )] for large
values of m3V (the universe volume in units of the cube of the reduced Compton
wavelength of the inflaton scalar field).
Since the inflaton mass m is very small in Planck units, say roughly 10−6 [7], the
factor of 4.5pi/m2 is very large, say roughly 1013, and one gets an utterly enormous
exponential peak in the measure at relatively small values of m3V . (There is a cutoff
in m3V at a value of order unity, below which there is no inflationary solution [8],
so the measure distribution does not actually have a divergence.) The expression
above for the measure rapidly decreases with increasing volume and then flattens
out to become asymptotically constant when m3V gets large in comparison with
exp (4.5pi/m2).
If one takes at face value the expression above for the measure for all values
of m3V above its lower cutoff (at some number of order unity), then although the
measure has an utterly enormous exponential peak at small values of m3V , this is
in turn overwhelmed by the divergence one gets when one integrates the measure
(actually a measure density) to infinite values ofm3V . Then the total measure would
be completely dominated by universes with arbitrarily large amounts of inflation.
This means that with unit normalized probability, our universe would be arbitrarily
large and arbitrarily flat when one ignores density fluctuations from corrections to
the homogeneous isotropic minisuperspace model [9].
However, the expression above for the measure is purely at the tree-level or zero-
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loop approximation, ignoring prefactors that are expected to distort the measure
distribution significantly for m3V large in comparison with exp (4.5pi/m2), because
these enormous universes are generated by inflation that starts with the inflaton
potential exceeding the Planck density, where one cannot trust the tree-level ap-
proximation or any other approximation we have at present.
If the correct quantum measure distribution diverges when one integrates to
infinity the spatial volume shortly after the end of inflation, then the universe is
most probably arbitrarily large and very near the critical density (spatially very
flat), whether a many-worlds or a single-history quantum theory is correct, and so
our observation of a universe near the critical density would not distinguish between
the two possibilities.
However, if the correct quantum measure density is cut off or damped for large
initial values of the inflaton energy density so that one does not get arbitrarily large
universes with certainty, then the enormous exponential peak in the distribution
at small universes is likely to dominate and (in a single-history version in which
the quantum state collapses to a single macroscopic Friedmann-Robertson-Walker
universe) make the universe most probably have only a small amount of inflation
and a very short lifetime, not sufficient to produce observers, like the first world
in the first example above. If one said that somehow the quantum state collapsed
to a Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe that gets large enough for observers,
then the most probable universe history under this requirement would be one that
lasts just barely long enough for observers before the final big crunch. In this case
the observers would most likely exist only near the end of the universe, when it is
recollapsing, like World A in the second example above, which is contrary to our
observations of an expanding universe. Thus a single-history version of this theory
with the quantum measure cut off to produce a normalizable probability distribution
would most likely be refuted by our observations of an expanding universe.
On the other hand, if one took a many-worlds version of this quantum cosmology
theory, one would have to weight the “worlds” (classical universes) by something
like the number of observers within them. One would expect this number to be
proportional to the volume of space at the time and other conditions when observers
can exist (other factors being equal) [10]. Therefore, in the many-worlds version one
would multiply the quantum measure given above for the “worlds” (the “bare”
probability distribution for universe configurations [11]) by something like V to get
the measure for observations (the “observational” probability distribution [11]).
The result, V exp [(4.5pi/m2)/(lnm3V +1.5 ln lnm3V )], is then sufficiently rapidly
rising with large m3V that the part with large m3V , even if cut off at m3V of
order exp (4.5pi/m2), dominates over the exponentially large peak near the minimum
value of m3V . There is thus enough space for the no-boundary proposal to be
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consistent with our observations of a large and expanding universe [11], but this
argument implicitly assumed a many-worlds version of the no-boundary proposal. A
similar assumption had been made earlier in the broader context of eternal stochastic
inflation [10]. In a single-history version, it seems plausible that the Hartle-Hawking
‘no-boundary’ quantum state may collapse with nearly unit probability to a classical
universe configuration that only lasts of the order of the Compton wavelength of the
inflaton scalar field, presumably far too short to be consistent with our observations.
This suggestive evidence against a single-history quantum cosmology theory is
of course not yet conclusive, since we do not yet know what the quantum state of
the universe is. Indeed, the ‘tunneling’ wavefunction proposals of Vilenkin, Linde,
and others [12] predict that the “bare” quantum measure for small universes is
exponentially suppressed, rather than enhanced as discussed above for the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal. The ‘tunneling’ proposals would thus apparently
be consistent with our observations whether one used a many-worlds version or a
single-history version. But the possibility is open that increased theoretical under-
standing of quantum cosmology may lead us to favor a quantum theory, such as
the ‘no-boundary’ one may turn out to be when it is better understood, that is
consistent with our observations only in its many-worlds version rather than in its
single-history version.
Another tentative piece of observational evidence in favor of many-worlds quan-
tum theory is a comparison with the calculation [13] of likely values of the cosmolog-
ical constant. If the assumptions of that paper are correct, and if the “subuniverses”
used there are the “worlds” used here (“terms in the state vector” [13]) rather than
different spacetime regions within one “world” (“local bangs” [13]), then our ob-
servational evidence of the cosmological constant is consistent with many-worlds
quantum theory but not with single-history quantum theory. However, we need a
better understanding of physics to know whether the assumptions are correct (such
as the assumption that “the cosmological constant takes a variety of values in dif-
ferent ‘subuniverses’ ” [13]).
Therefore, it may turn out, when we better understand fundamental physics and
quantum cosmology, that the observational evidence of the expansion of the universe
and of the cosmological constant may lead us to favor many-world quantum theories
over single-history quantum theories.
I am grateful for very helpful discussions with Meher Antia, Jerry Finkelstein,
Jim Hartle, and Jacques Mallah. This research was supported in part by the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
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